

## Abstracts

### Anders Nes: 'Conceptualism and the Explanatory Role of Experience. Some Reflections on Campbell's case for a Relational over a Representational View'

John Campbell's forceful defence of a relational over a representational view of perceptual experience, in his *Reference and Consciousness* and a number of subsequent papers, has been a key impetus behind the surge in interest in relational and naive realist view over the last decade. Although his arguments already have attracted much discussion, I propose to have one more look at them. I will do so from the perspective of a view I call 'attentional conceptualism', a view that proposes to theoretically identify conscious attention to an object with entertaining a demonstrative concept of it. Although some of Campbell's claims and arguments do seem to oppose this view, I will suggest some of them can be construed as (perhaps surprisingly) congenial to it. Among the arguments that do seem to pose a challenge to the view, I distinguish three, viz. the arguments that Representational Views, and thus attentional conceptualism, to the extent that it is such a view, (i) assimilate perceptual experience to just another propositional attitude; (ii) are unable to allow perceptual experience to be perceptual experience of categorical objects and properties; and (iii) are unable to allow a suitable explanatory role, in cognition, for conscious experience, thus raising the spectre of epiphenomenalism. I will consider how attentional conceptualism may respond to these challenges.

### Jessica Pepp: 'Reference as a Form of Acquaintance'

**Does the use or existence of genuine referring expressions require acquaintance with their referents? The question is difficult to grasp, because there are various things one could mean by both "genuine referring expression" and "acquaintance." One tradition in the philosophy of language sees "genuine referring expressions" as distinguished members of a broader category of designating expressions. In this tradition, various notions of acquaintance may be used alongside other restrictions to winnow the genuine referrers from the mere designators. It has proved difficult, in this framework, to maintain the acquaintance requirement that many find intuitive, as has recently been argued by John Hawthorne and David Manley (*The Reference Book*, Oxford University Press, 2012). However, the framework of designation is not inevitable. We can begin, as John Stuart Mill did, by noting a difference between names and descriptions and by exploring that difference without assuming a broader commonality. (This switch in frameworks has been suggested by Joseph Almog (*Referential Mechanics*, Oxford University Press, 2014).) I argue that this starting point offers a different path to the discovery of "genuine referring expressions" and makes certain acquaintance requirements on them easier to sustain. It also suggests that a basic notion of acquaintance is not merely one constraint among others on genuine reference, but goes to the heart of what reference is.**

### Solveig Aasen: 'The Mechanism of Acquaintance'

One widely applied strategy for criticising acquaintance views of singular thought is to argue that they fail to include cases that should be included, according to an alternative or intuitive conception of 'singular thought'. But it is also possible to evaluate acquaintance views on their own terms, by asking how acquaintance works. How does standing in a direct relation to an object, for instance by perceiving it, make possible singular thought about that object? I consider two replies to this question, provided by Imogen Dickie (2010) and John Campbell (2002) respectively. I argue that Dickie's account comes too close to simply being a restatement of the claim sought explained. And I propose that a natural extension of Campbell's account reveals awareness of an object, whether due to acquaintance or some other circumstance, to be the essential ingredient in his explanation. What is special about how an acquaintance-relation enables thought remains elusive.

### Bill Brewer: 'The Object View of Perception'

I begin with a three-fold distinction between theories of the nature of our perceptual relation with the physical world. Current debate focuses on the opposition between two of them. I develop objections to one of these and articulate and defend the other. This strategy raises issues about the explanatory obligations of theories of perception, the opposition between the two current contenders, and the place of abnormal perceptual phenomena in their evaluation.

### Jonathan Knowles: Naïve Realism as Existential Phenomenology

Naïve realism (NR) is the view that perceptual experience is fundamentally and essentially characterised *inter alia* by way of environmental objects and their perceptible characteristics. It opposes perceptual representationalism (PR), the view that perceptual experience is fundamentally and essentially characterised by reference to representation of objects (etc.) we perceive, not the objects themselves. Though NR is often motivated in the first instance by phenomenological considerations, I believe this case can be strengthened by seeing NR as flowing from what Dreyfus calls an *existential phenomenological conception of experience* (EPE). In the present debate, NR is standardly viewed as a position about particular perceptual experiences, 'relationism', on which we bear a special intentional relation to objects of experience known as 'acquaintance'. Moreover, as such, NR typically engages with PR under the assumption of metaphysical realism (MR): the view that there is a unitary, thoroughly mind-independent and (probably, in some sense) ultimately physical reality that it is the job of philosophical theories to explain the basic features of in a way that also explains how we can know it as it is. I will argue that NR plausibly loses the battle understood as relationism, but that construed as part of EPE, which rejects MR, it has more promise. I will also say why I think EPE is a position we should take seriously.